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The purpose of this thesis is to research the history of the Corps SAM 
program, focusing on the issue of whether to maintain competition or to down select 
to a single contractor. An analysis is conducted to examine the down selection and 
whether the program risks of cost overrun, failure to meet schedule, and poor 
weapon performance can be averted without the use of continuous competition. 
This thesis concludes that down selection to one contractor provides more benefit 
to the program than maintaining competition throughout the acquisition process for 
the Corps SAM program. 
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A.   GENERAL 
In previous years, the traditional role of U. S. military- 
forces was to support peacetime deterrence through a forward 
presence, particularly in the European theater. Forces were 
deploying in a prepared defensive posture. Today, the military 
faces new challenges as it adapts to a world that has 
undergone greater change than any time since the end of World 
War II. These changes caused a shift in our National Military 
Strategy that led to a change in the U.S. military's focus 
from "containment of the Soviet Union and its communist 
ideology" to "adaptive regional planning" that provides the 
"strategic agility to mass overwhelming force and terminate 
conflict swiftly and decisively." [Ref. 22:p. 12,26] This 
shift in our National Military Strategy led to post-Cold War 
reductions in U.S. forces and redirected our strategic 
planning toward regional contingency operations. [Ref. 11:p. 
1-4] 
The U.S. Army's Air Defense Artillery (ADA) force 
structure, doctrine, and operational requirements are evolving 
in reaction to the new operational environment. A combination 
of the integrated capabilities of multiple systems is 
necessary for the defense of theater assets and maneuver 
forces. The Corps Surface-to-Air-Missile (Corps SAM) or the 
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Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) as named by the 
international partnership, will provide the strategic 
deployability, tactical mobility, and lethal surface-to-air 
missile fire-power necessary to respond to a contingency 
crisis. It will be able to defeat low radar cross-section 
(RCS) targets such as the cruise missile (CM), unmanned aerial 
vehicles (UAV), tactical air-to-surface-missiles (TASM), anti- 
radiation missiles (ARM), and short range tactical ballistic 
missiles (TBM). It will be also capable of defeating fixed and 
rotary wing aircraft. [Ref. ll:p.3-l] Designed with strategic 
deployability in mind, Corps SAM will adapt well to providing 
early-on, lower-tier enclave defense, with Theater High 
Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) providing the upper-tier. 
[Ref. ll:p.2-10] 
There is a current void in the U.S. Army ADA force 
structure due to the retirement on September 1, 1994 of the 
aging and obsolete HAWK missile system. The HAWK was becoming 
increasingly incapable of meeting operational requirements and 
defending against a diverse and proliferated threat. Corps SAM 
will fill the current void in providing adequate protection 
for maneuver forces as those forces seek to overwhelm the 
enemy and achieve land force dominance. 
Sun Tzu, an ancient Chinese philosopher, stated over 
twenty-five hundred years ago: 
If  you   know   the   enemy   and  know  yourself,   you   need  not 
fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself 
but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also 
suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, 
you will  succumb  in  every battle.    [Ref. 35:p. 18] 
Our soldiers must know the potential threat capabilities 
and their own on the battlefield. In the Acquisition Corps we 
must also know the potential threats. The threats or risks are 
cost overruns, failure to meet schedule, and poor weapon 
system performance. We must know our capabilities. In order to 
combat these risks and not succumb to their potential 
advantage over us, we must evaluate trade-off strategies. 
This thesis reviews the short history of the Corps SAM 
program, concentrating on the issue of whether to maintain 
competition or to "down select" to a single contractor. It 
examines down selection and whether the risks of cost overrun, 
failure to meet schedule, and poor weapon performance can be 
averted without the use of continuous competition. 
B.   OBJECTIVES OF RESEARCH 
The objective of this study is to examine whether down 
selection to one contractor provides less benefit than 
competition throughout the Corps SAM acquisition process, 
based on the factors of cost, schedule, performance, and 
associated risks. 
C.   RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Primary Research Question: Does down selection to one 
contractor at the end of Project Definition-Validation phase 
provide less benefit than maintaining competition throughout 
the acquisition process for the Corps SAM program? 
Subsidiary Research Questions: 
1. What were the factors against which the down selection 
decision was made? 
2. What types of risks are associated with the down 
selection to one contractor in the Corps SAM program? 
3. What is the actual impact of down selection on the 
program from an economic standpoint? 
D.   METHODOLOGY 
This study begins with an overview of the Corps SAM 
program: the mission, background, evolution, and the 
Quadrilateral International Agreement that have maintained the 
viability of this program. 
This is followed by an overview of the nature of 
competition, the history of competition in DOD, the types of 
competition, potential benefits of using competition early in 
the program, and the factors affecting the use of competition. 
The focus then shifts to analyzing the program risk in 
terms of  potential cost overruns, schedule delays and poor 
performance. The researcher looks specifically at the factors 
involved in down selection. These factors are analyzed in 
terms of advantages and disadvantages. Then after analyzing 
the factors, the use of down selection is examined by 
refraining how down selection is normally viewed and how it is 
viewed from an economic standpoint. 
This methodology for research focuses on information 
obtained from (1) current procurement literature obtained from 
the Naval Postgraduate School, (2) documentation obtained from 
the Corps SAM Program Office in Huntsville, AL, and (3) the 
Concept and Studies Division, United States Army Air Defense 
Artillery School at Fort Bliss, TX.  Methodology also includes 
a search of Corps SAM and acguisition related references from 
(4) the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC), and (5) 
the Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange (DLSIE). 
Further research information was obtained from telephonic and 
personal interviews with the Corps SAM Deputy Program Manager 
and the Corps SAM Chief of Program & Acguisition Management 
at Huntsville, AL. 
E.   SCOPE OF STUDY 
This study only addresses down selection and no other 
acguisition streamlining methods associated with the Corps SAM 
acguisition plan. This paper does not include system 
characteristics, capabilities, or discussions classified in 
nature. 
F.   ASSUMPTIONS 
It is assumed that readers of this study have an 
understanding of the basic concepts and regulations applicable 
to systems acguisition, and an understanding of economics. 
G.   BENEFITS OF THIS STUDY 
By examining the Corps SAM program, this thesis serves as 
a basis for future research and discussion of down selection 
as a streamlining and tailoring method for a given major 
weapon system. A second objective is to consolidate 
references of various reports, documents, articles, and 
various program perspectives into a single source reference 
for Corps SAM. 
II.  CORPS SAM SYSTEM 
A.   INTRODUCTION 
This chapter covers the background of the Corps SAM 
program from its early inception in 1987, to its cancellation 
and its rebirth, to another cancellation and rebirth, and 
several near cancellations, to where it is today. The Corps 
SAM Program has not had a solid institutional foundation since 
its beginnings, and not until recently has it achieved a firm 
base of Congressional support. Its history is full of 
cancellations, potential cancellations, funding cutbacks, and 
deferments. Though its road has not been a straight one, it 
now looks like the Corps SAM Program is here to stay as an 
international effort.  [Ref. 29] 
B.   MISSION OF CORPS SAM 
Corps SAM will fill the current void created by the 
retirement of the HAWK missile system in providing protection 
to the U.S. Army corps's critical assets and maneuver forces 
from air and missile attack. Corps SAM will counter, defeat, 
and destroy TBMs, CMs, UAVs, TASMs, ARMs, as well as rotary 
and fixed wing aircraft targeted against U.S. Army corps 
assets and maneuver units. It will operate in synergy with 
Forward Area Air Defense (FAAD), theater ADA assets such as 
Patriot and THAAD, as well as joint and combined air defense 
systems. [Ref 10:p. 3-1] Then Major General John H. Little, 
Commandant, United States Army Air Defense Artillery School, 
stated the Corps SAM mission in 1993: 
Vie need Corps SAM to protect Corps forces from short- 
range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, UAVs, RPVs and low 
observable platforms. Corps SAM will deny preferred attack 
options to the enemy, reduce the threat of mass casualties in 
the maneuver area, incorporate a high degree of mobility to 
support the type of rapid Corps movements seen in Desert Storm 
and augment  the Patriot  and THAAD combination.     [Ref.   24:p.   9] 
C.   BACKGROUND OF CORPS SAM 
The Corps SAM program was initiated in 1987 when it was 
initially identified as the Medium Surface-to-Air Missile 
(MSAM) project. A system need was determined from data 
generated during a study of threat deficiencies that existed 
in the HAWK low-to-medium air defense system. The Senate 
Appropriations Committee, however, deferred this program until 
19 90 because the HAWK Product Improvement Program (PIP) 
enhancements were just being deployed.   [Ref. 2:p. 1-1] 
The present Corps SAM program was initiated in 1990. The 
Army Battlefield Development Plan identified the need for a 
corps air defense capability because of the inherent 
limitations in the HAWK air defense system. An analysis of the 
mission area indicated that the corps air defense need could 
not be satisfied by a nonmaterial solution. In August 1990, 
the Corps Air Defense Capability Mission Need Statement (MNS) 
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was validated by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council 
(JROC) and the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) Milestone (MS) 
0 review approved the program to enter the Concept Exploration 
and Development (CED) phase [Ref. 14:p. 2] The Corps SAM 
program was assigned to Project Management Office (PMO) 
authority in September 1990. [Ref. 2:p. 1-1] 
Several months later the Army's Corps SAM program was 
canceled because of Congressional action to consolidate a long 
list of Pentagon anti-tactical ballistic missile projects into 
one program managed by the Strategic Defense Initiative 
Organization (SDIO), now the Ballistic Missile Defense 
Organization (BMDO). [Ref 6:p. 30] 
The Corps SAM program was revived again in Fiscal Year 
(FY) 92 as an international project under the sponsorship of 
BMDO's Tactical Missile Defense Initiative to which Congress 
gave approval. In early 1992, the Corps SAM weapon system 
emerged as a top U.S. Army research priority due to the use of 
Iraqi Scud missiles during the Persian Gulf War, and the CED 
phase was restarted. This resulted in the award of seven 
contracts to six contractors in July 1992. These contractors 
consisted of Hughes Missile Systems, Tucson, AZ; Lockheed 
Missiles and Space Co., Sunnyvale, CA; Loral Vought Systems 
Corporation, Dallas, TX; Martin Marietta Electronics and 
Missiles, Orlando, FL; Raytheon Co., Lexington, MA; and 
British Aerospace, London. [Ref. 3:p. 11] [Ref. 9:p. 37] [Ref. 
14:p. 2]  During the CED studies, six contractors analyzed the 
cost, schedule, and performance of modified existing systems, 
new surface-to-air missile systems, hypervelocity guns, and 
directed energy weapons. 
Because of these studies, it was decided that a new 
surface-to-air missile system was the only viable solution to 
satisfy the Corps SAM concept requirements. Analysis of these 
studies also concluded that there was significant similarity 
in the technical solutions proposed, and therefore there were 
not significant differences in the risks associated with these 
solutions. [Ref. 12:p. C-10] 
The Missile Command's (MICOM) Research, Development, and 
Engineering Center (RDEC) also conducted extensive studies and 
analyses that further defined feasible and cost effective 
system concepts, consistent with the emerging Corps SAM 
requirements and threat definition. These analyses, along 
with the results of the CED studies, were used to balance the 
requirements contained in the Operational Requirements 
Document (ORD). [Ref. 14:p. 2] During this phase, the Corps 
SAM ORD was jointly developed and approved by the U.S. Army 
and the U.S. Marine Corps. 
In 1993, the Corps SAM program again faced scrutiny under 
the Pentagon Strategic Systems Committee' s comprehensive 
review of BMDO's weapon programs. Budget constraints and 
competition from existing but less capable theater missile 
systems had the potential to cancel the Corps SAM program. 
[Ref. 23:p. 4] 
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Then in May 1993, then Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition and Technology (USD(A&T)), John Deutch, expressed 
his support for the Corps SAM program to then Secretary of 
Defense (SECDEF) Les Aspin, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, General Colin Powell, and the military Service 
chiefs. This support by the USD(A&T) was instrumental, 
politically, in the survival of the Corps SAM program. 
Lieutenant General Donald Leonetti, then Commander, U.S. Army 
Space and Strategic Defense Command, also supported the Corps 
SAM program, stating that it was needed to counter low-flying 
missiles and aircraft.   [Ref. 25:p. 8] 
In September 1993, the JROC designated the U.S. Army as 
the final approval authority for the Corps SAM ORD. The ORD 
was approved by the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations 
and Plans (DCSOPS) in October 1993. During FY94 the Corps SAM 
program office activities focused primarily on the development 
and release of the draft RFP for Concept Development phase, 
continued exploration of international cooperation 
opportunities, initiation of the Deputy Secretary of Defense's 
(DEPSECDEF) decision to pursue a trilateral international 
program, and revision of the acquisition strategy to include 
the trilateral cooperation. [Ref. 14:p. 2-3] 
In February 1994 a joint memorandum for the USD(A&T) was 
signed by both the Vice Chief of Staff, Army and the Assistant 
Commandant of the Marine Corps stating that the requirements 
contained in the ORD satisfy the mission need for a joint Army 
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Corps SAM and Marine Corps MSAM system. This memorandum 
highlighted the compelling joint Corps SAM requirement that 
without it, the Army and Marine Corps maneuver forces would be 
placed at risk with no defense against short range ballistic 
missiles and only extremely limited capability against cruise 
missile attacks. [Ref. 14:p. 4] 
Also in September 1993, the results of the SECDEF's 
Bottom-Up Review (BUR) delayed major development efforts on 
Corps SAM until FY98.  The program was then restructured to 
conduct a Concept Development phase (FY95-97) in the interim. 
The acquisition strategy was restructured to accommodate 
the results of the SECDEF's BUR, and the draft RFP for Concept 
Development was released on a limited basis to Loral-Vought, 
Lockheed, Martin Marietta, Raytheon, and Hughes Aircraft in 
April 1994. During the maturation of the Concept Development 
draft RFP, the Program Manager emphasized the need for a 
quality draft RFP so that comments from other agencies and 
especially industry could be incorporated into the final RFP. 
[Ref. 13:p. 7]  Following the results of industry review of 
the draft, the RFP was updated and revised to incorporate the 
contractor's comments and recommendations.  In addition, the 
PMO conducted several meetings with industry representatives 
to inform them of the program status. 
The latest threat to the program occurred in July 1995, 
when the Senate Armed Services and Appropriations Committees 
deleted the entire 1996 Corps SAM funding request of $30.4 
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million. The House committees also cut the funding request by 
$20.4 million. These committees felt that the Army should 
look at existing technologies to develop one system that could 
provide seamless coverage against incoming missiles. (As 
mentioned earlier in this chapter, it had been previously 
determined that a nonmaterial solution would not satisfy the 
mission need.) The program was then provided with $35 million 
in funding by a motion proposed by Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA), 
that reversed the committees' rulings. 
[Ref. 21:p. 11] [Ref. 26:p. 32-33] 
The program has survived to fulfill the user's stated 
mission need. Today the Corps SAM weapon system is envisioned 
to be the center of the U.S. Army's Corps Area Air Defense. 
The Corps SAM weapon system is planned to be fielded in the 
3rd Quarter, 2005 time-frame. [Ref. 2:p. 1-1] 
D.   QUADRILATERAL INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT 
In addition to approving entry into the CED phase, Corps 
SAM's MS 0 Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM) required the 
Corps SAM program office to explore cooperative opportunities 
with allied countries. In August 1990, then USD(A&T) John 
Betti wanted to use Corps SAM as a first step to get other 
NATO nations and Japan involved in the International Defense 
Cooperation Strategy and sent a letter on 18 September 1990 to 
Germany urging involvement.  The U.S. Army stated that other 
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nations were invited as well. [Ref 5:p. 10] In May 1991, the 
U.S. and Germany began a three-year study aimed at developing 
a long range air defense system. [Ref. 7:p. 29] The German 
Government was invited again in February 1994 by the USD(A&T) 
to participate in the Corps SAM program. Former USD(A&T) John 
Deutch stated to Germany and France, that without them, the 
U.S. could not make Corps SAM a reality. [Ref. 29] In June 
1994, the German Government responded, expressing their desire 
to make the program a U.S. and European cooperative program by 
expanding the effort to France. In August 1994, the 
discussions between the DEPSECDEF and his counterparts from 
Germany and France resulted in a decision to pursue a 
trilateral cooperative program for development of Corps SAM. 
[Ref. 14:p. 3] Each of the Governments and their respective 
defense firms expressed interest in Corps SAM as a meaningful 
development program for the 1990s. [Ref. 8:p. 33] 
Then in February 1995, the Italians expressed their 
desire to become part of the international agreement. The 
Corps SAM program was officially recognized as a Quadrilateral 
International program between the United States, Germany, 
France, and Italy on 20 February 1995. [Ref. 9:p. 37] Under 
this arrangement, costs and work will be shared 50 percent by 
the United States, 20 percent each by Germany and France, and 
10 percent by Italy. [Ref. 34] 
The Governments find this program to be mutually 
beneficial in terms of meeting military readiness and being 
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able to fulfill a need with their ever-dwindling defense 
budgets. The defense industries find this type of program 
appealing because it expands their international customer 
base. It is a win-win situation on a global scale during a 
time of shrinking defense budgets. 
E.   ACQUISITION STREAMLINING 
Since the program's rebirth in August 1990, the Corps SAM 
Program Manager has been focused on acguisition streamlining. 
Acquisition streamlining is "any effort that results in more 
efficient and effective use of resources to develop or produce 
quality systems." [Ref. 37:p. 15-2] Early in the program, 
streamlining was focused on two primary principles: (1) 
avoidance of premature specification of the technical 
solution, and (2) obtaining industry input into the 
acquisition process. [Ref. 1] [Ref. 13:p. 1] These principles 
were factored into the Milestone (MS) I preparation and 
acquisition planning. Before issuance of the Corps SAM CED 
studies Request for Proposal (RFP) in February 1992, a Request 
for Information (RFI) was sent out to industry to provide the 
Government with a variety of technical information on 
components, subsystems, and systems that would be beneficial 
in providing a Corps SAM solution. This information was used 
to enhance independent Government studies and to ensure that 
the language in the CED studies was not too restrictive. 
In addition, an industry briefing was conducted in which 
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industry questions were answered. This process helped 
contractors in understanding the Government's intent. During 
the source selection process, clear source selection criteria 
were used in which the technical concept was weighted the 
highest. [Ref. 13:p.l] This enabled resources to be focused 
in the areas that were most important. 
Several methods of streamlining that are planned to be 
used in this procurement include concurrent engineering, 
combined Design and Development phase (provides seamless 
transition from Demonstration and Validation (DEM/VAL) phase 
to Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) phase with 
no program breaks in design, fabrication, and test), system 
simulations, partnering, and down selection. This is also 
called total development.  [Ref. 13:p. 1-8] 
1.  The 1995 Program Schedule 
A revised, updated, and more streamlined Concept 
Development RFP was released on 1 March 1995, and proposals 
were received back in the Corps SAM program office on 2 June 
1995. From the original six U.S. contractors who participated 
in the CED studies, down selection to two U.S. contractors 
occurred on 12 October 1995. Lockheed Martin and the H&R 
Company (the joint venture of Hughes Aircraft Company and 
Raytheon Company) were selected as the winners of the 
competition.  The two U.S. contractors will team with the 
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International Contracting Teams made up of contractors from 
Germany, France, and Italy for about four months, updating 
their Project Definition-Validation (PD-V) Proposal.  (The PD- 
V phase is adopted from the NATO Acquisition process.  See 
Figures 1 and 2.)  Contract awards are projected to occur in 
January  1996,  following the  signing of the  Corps  SAM 
Memorandum of Understanding between the U.S., Germany, France, 
and Italy.  These two Contractor Teams will be required to 
conduct simulations, analyses, and trade-off studies to better 
define the system and to draft the system specification for 
development.  Down selection to one International Team will 
occur when a proposal is chosen and a letter contract is 
signed to start work at MS I in the Design and Development 
phase.  The only loser in this down selection will be one of 
the U.S. contractors.  Once the Corps SAM office has leveraged 
the  benefit  of  competing weapons  designs  from  several 
contractors, the Corps SAM Program Manager (PM) will be able 
to make an informed choice as to the best design and down 
select to that one contractor. Down selection, in this Corps 
SAM acquisition process, is a means of managing risk control 
by trading-off the risk of a cost overrun for affordability. 
[Ref. 34] 
The development effort will also loosely reflect the 
NATO Acquisition Process and will be divided into two Project 
Definition-Validation (PD-V) contracts, followed by the Design 
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with the CED phase, and the NATO Design and Development phase 
is the combining of DEM/VAL and EMD phases. This combining 
will provide continuity in the development process that will 
include all efforts required to accomplish the objectives of 
both the DEM/VAL and EMD phases of development. Two U.S. 
prime contractors with their International Contractor Team 
counterparts will be awarded PD-V contracts. Based on work 
conducted during PD-V following receipt of the Design and 
Development proposals, the U.S. Government will down select to 
one contractor (See Figure 3). 
Upon a successful MS I decision review, the selected 
contractor will execute the Design and Development effort. 
[Ref. 13:p. 4] This Design and Development contract will 
support system development from MS I to MS III, called the 
Design and Development phase, providing a "seamless" contract 
(ie., continuous development) during the MS II transition. At 
MS IV the decision will be made start the Production phase. 
2.  Strategy 
The Corps SAM acquisition strategy is to procure the 
system development of the Corps SAM weapon system in a single 
competitively awarded cost-plus-incentive-fee/award-fee 
(CPIF/CPAF) contract. [Ref. 12:p. C-6] The Low Rate Initial 
Production (LRIP) contract will be a sole source CPIF contract 
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contract. Subsequent full rate production contracts are 
expected to be sole source firm fixed-price contracts, and the 
duration of full production is estimated to be about 48 
months. [Ref. ll:p. C-10] 
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III.  AN OVERVIEW OF COMPETITION 
A.   INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines the background of competition in 
Government policy, the types of competition used in the 
acquisition process, and the advantages and disadvantages 
associated with the use of competition. The chapter then 
examines how competition and down selection has been used in 
the Corps SAM program. At the end of this chapter, an overview 
of risk management is introduced. 
Increased competition in the acquisition of major weapon 
systems has been considered by both Government and industry as 
one possible solution to the many and well-publicized problems 
surrounding Government procurement. Besides the well-founded 
belief that competition will result in lower prices, other 
benefits include improved quality and reliability, technical 
innovation in addressing new requirements, the expansion of 
our industrial base, and the appearance of safeguarding the 
public trust in the awarding of contracts and the commitment 
of public funds.  [Ref. 31:p. 10-12] 
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B.   LAWS AND REGULATIONS 
Preferences for competitive procurement methods have been 
clearly expressed in both Public Law and in Executive Branch 
policies.  For example: 
1. Office of Management and Budget Circular A-109, dated 
5 April 1976, states in its general policy:  [Ref. 27:p. 3] 
• Express needs and program objectives in mission 
terms and not equipment terms to encourage 
innovation and competition in creating, exploring 
and developing alternative system design 
concepts. 
•     Place emphasis on the initial activities of the 
system acquisition process to allow 
competitive exploration of alternative system 
design concepts in response to mission needs. 
2. Defense Appropriations Act of 1984 (Public Law 98- 
212) clearly requires that production competition analysis be 
conducted on all major weapon system acquisitions. The person 
responsible for ensuring that production competition analysis 
is conducted is the Program Manager.  [Ref. 16:p. 1-4] 
3. The Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) (Public Law 
98-369), which became effective in April 1985, strongly 
affirms that "full and open competition" is the standard 
acquisition method and that sole source procurement is the 
exception. Full and open competition may be waived, however, 
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for several reasons including national emergency, national 
security, and terms of an agreement between the U.S. and a 
Foreign Government that has the effect of reguiring the use of 
noncompetitive procedures. [Ref. 4:p. 2-17-2-18] 
4. The DOD Directive 5000.1 states: [Ref.36:p. 1-6] 
• Defense systems, subsystems, eguipment, supplies 
and services shall be acguired on a competitive 
basis to the maximum extent practicable as a 
means of achieving cost, schedule, and 
performance benefits. 
• The feasibility, cost, and benefits of 
competition in each phase of a program's 
implementation shall be explicitly addressed at 
each milestone, beginning with the new start 
milestone decision point. This includes 
competition for ideas and technologies in the 
early phases, and the use of competitive 
procedures that provide the greatest benefit to 
the Government. 
5. The DOD Directive 5000.2 reflects legal reguirements 
for competition at the prime and subcontractor level that must 
be considered during each acguisition phase and that 
Acguisition Category I (ACAT I) programs must have: [Ref. 
37:p. 3-9, 3-12, 3-15] 
Competitive Prototyping. Acguisition strategies 
must include provisions for competitive 
prototyping unless the milestone decision 
authority determines that competitive prototyping 
is not practicable and such rationale is included 
in the Acguisition Strategy Report. (10 U.S.C. 
2438) 
Competitive   Alternative   Development   and 
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Production. Acquisition strategies must be 
prepared by the Secretary of Defense (as 
delegated) and must allow the option for 
competitive alternative sources for the system 
and each major subsystem under the program 
throughout the period from the beginning of full 
scale (engineering and manufacturing) development 
through the end of procurement. (10 U.S.C. 
2439) 
In short, a Program Manager is required by law and policy 
to pursue and seek out competition to the greatest extent 
possible during all phases of the acquisition process. There 
are, however, waivers to the competition requirement and 
competitive prototyping as mentioned earlier in this chapter. 
C.   DESIGN VS. PRODUCTION COMPETITION 
In the decision-making scheme of awarding a contract to 
a potential contractor, the Program Manager is concerned with 
two forms of competition in the acquisition process: design or 
technical competition and production or price competition. 
1.   Design or Technical Competition 
Design competition is: 
Competition during a program's validation or 
early design phase, where two or more companies 
develop conceptual or design approaches to 
satisfy a mission need, one or more of which 
will be used for the production contract. The 
competition can be extended through the DEM/VAL 
phase and into EMD phase to obtain prototype 
performance verification and to provide a natural 
competition   for  the  production  contract. 
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Typically, in large programs design competition 
ceases at EMD. The purpose of design competition 
is to select the best technical approach within 
affordable costs, thus providing a realistic 
cost. [Ref. 15:p. 5-1]  [Ref. 16:p. 1-8] 
The purpose of design competition is to identify and 
develop a variety of technical approaches that meet or exceed 
the mission need within the constraints of affordability. 
This competition primarily occurs during the preliminary 
phases of the acquisition process. The process for this 
competition is generally observed with the award of multiple 
contracts during the CED phase, followed by down selection to 
generally two or more contracts in DEM/VAL phase. This follows 
with the award of a contract to one or two contractors, who 
enter into EMD with a single design deemed to provide the best 
value to the Government.  [Ref.l6:p. 1-8-1-9] 
2.   Production Competition 
Production competition is: 
Competition where two or more companies bid to 
secure all or part of a production contract. 
Thus there may be a winner-take-all competition 
or the production may be split between two 
contractors. The competitors may have 
participated in the program before the first 
production contract, or one or more may have been 
brought in through a second sourcing strategy. 
This competition occurs during EMD and/or 
Production phases. [Ref. 15:p. 5-1] 
[Ref. 16:p. 1-12-1-15] 
The goals of production competition are to procure the 
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system at a fair and reasonable price to both the Government 
and the contractors, to continue to encourage quality and 
technical improvements, and to expand the industrial base for 
use in case of full mobilization or surge requirements. 
In contrast to design competition, which is concerned 
with projecting a realistic price, production competition is 
concerned with ensuring a fair and reasonable price. During 
production, however, the contractor's primary concern is with 
the profit earned from making the weapon system. It is during 
production in the sole source environment that the Government 
may see the cost of a system rising and find that it has 
little or no leverage to inhibit cost escalation. Production 
competition has been the most effective method the Government 
has used for ensuring that the price paid for the system is 
fair and reasonable. [Ref. 16: 1-8-1-14] 
After working under the umbrella of CICA for 10 years, 
many observers are concerned that the strong preference for 
competition may be resulting, in certain cases, in improper 
cost, schedule, and performance trade-offs for added 
competitive awards. [Ref. 32:p. 121] 
The Program Manager must think as an investor in 
competition. What is the Government's Return On Investment 
(ROI)? How much will it cost the Government to get a fair and 
reasonable price? If competition is chosen over down 
selection, the initial costs of competition can exceed any 
cost advantage realized later in the acquisition process when 
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managing a weapons program that is highly technical and 
complex. [Ref. 15:p. 5-3]  The up-front investment is most 
apparent in production competition in soliciting a second 
source from the solicitation itself,  the costs associated 
with the second source selection and gualification, technology 
transfer and possible proprietary data, procurement of special 
and general tooling and test eguipment, and gualification 
testing. These are all nonrecurring costs invested by the 
Government in the program.   There are also administrative 
costs associated with recurring solicitations and contract 
award, and the management of two contractors.  The management 
of competition during the Production phase is especially 
complex, reguiring significant management oversight to secure 
the benefits of competition.  [Ref. 16:p. 1-17-1-19] 
D.   ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF COMPETITION 
There are positive and negative aspects of competition in 
controlling program risk in terms of cost, schedule, and 
performance.  Advantages include:  [Ref. 15:p. 5-2-5-3] 
• Obtaining a lower price for a product 
• Obtaining a higher guality product 
• Expanding the industrial base 
• Enhancing surge capability in an emergency 
• Providing more  than one  source  for product 
innovation 
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Facilitating the achievement of socioeconomic 
goals 
Meeting delivery schedule reguirements 
Encouraging contractors to be more receptive to 
the concerns of the Government and to address 
criticisms 
Disadvantages include: 
Increased initial cost due to duplication of work 
to administer contracts, prepare to produce a 
product, or accomplish a specific task 
More complex and costly support of duplicate 
products in the field 
Variations in guality between competitive 
products 
Weakening of any working relationship that exists 
between a specific contractor and the program 
office 
Increase in schedule length due to increased 
program complexity 
Increased difficulty in managing the program 
No guarantee that funding will be maintained 
Increased cost and schedule risk due to 
contractor learning curve retardation 
E.   COMPETITION IN THE CORPS SAM PROGRAM 
In the Corps SAM acguisition strategy for accelerated 
procurement, design competition occurred with the awarding of 
seven contracts during CED and will continue through PD-V with 
two contracts.  Production competition will not be used as 
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down selection to one contractor will occur at MS I, the 
beginning of the Design and Development phase. During the CED 
studies, there were significant similarities in the technical 
solutions among the contractor's proposals. The PM believes 
that there is little need for comparison among the 
technologies between the contractors and thus no need to carry- 
both through Design and Development phase. It is at this 
point that the Program Manager feels that the competitive 
designs will be somewhat stable, and the trade-off between 
affordability and the risk of a cost overrun can be made. 
[Ref. 28] 
The Corps SAM Program Manager felt that competition after 
MS I would neither streamline the process nor reduce cost, 
schedule, and performance risk in the Design and Development 
or Production phases. [Ref. 28] 
During the conduct of the Concept Definitions studies, as 
mentioned in the introduction, streamlining for the Corps SAM 
program became an increasingly important initiative of the 
Army leadership. The Army Acguisition Executive (AAE) issued 
a memorandum to the PEO, Missile Defense, which directed 
development of an innovative approach to the acguisition of 
Corps SAM. [Ref. 13:p. 1] Down selection to one contractor 
is one aspect of the Corps SAM program's innovative 
streamlining strategy. The researcher's primary purpose of 
thesis is to evaluate the Program Manager's decision to down 
select at MS I. 
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F.   PROGRAM RISK IN TERMS OF COST, SCHEDULE, AND PERFORMANCE 
In the development and production of new major weapon 
systems, the potential risk of cost overruns, schedule 
overruns, and poor performance is a very real threat to the 
program and a challenge to control. The PM of a program is 
tasked to manage and control risk. Program decisions 
concerning risk are normally concentrated on cost and 
schedule. The increasing user demand for weapon's performance 
opens the field to another area of risk, that of technical 
complexity of new weapon systems. This area must also be 
assessed by the PM, who must look at how the impact of cost 
and schedule decisions relate to technical performance. [Ref. 
17:p. 2-2-2-4] 
In weapon programs there are a variety of factors that 
must be analyzed before assuming a level of risk that is 
considered controllable. The presence or absence of program 
factors may induce or reduce a risky situation. The factors 
may denote sources of potential jeopardy in a program. The 
situation where the program could be jeopardized can be 
controlled by knowing these factors and taking action to 
overcome them. The PM must be aware of potential cost and 
schedule problems and their affect on potential technical 
risks. It is critical for the PM to make a risk assessment in 
analyzing these factors when deciding whether to choose 
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competition or down selection and if the risk is acceptable 
based on the assessment. [Ref. 17 :p. 3-6-3-7] The risk 
factors in the Corps SAM program are discussed in the next 
chapter. 
G.   SUMMARY 
This chapter presented Government policy that clearly 
expressed the Program Manager's responsibility to pursue 
competition. If in the best interests of the Government, 
waivers to competition may be attained. This chapter then 
discussed design and production competition and the associated 
benefits and concerns in using them. The plan for competition 
in the Corps SAM program was addressed, as well as the 
concerns of the costs associated with competition. Lastly, 
this chapter introduced an overview of risk management. The 
Corps SAM program after MS I will result in down selection if 




IV.  FACTORS AFFECTING COMPETITION VS. DOWN SELECTION 
A.   INTRODUCTION 
In the context of down selection, there are factors that 
will persuade and convince the PM to choose down selection as 
an option in reducing risk in terms of cost, schedule, and 
performance in the acquisition process. This chapter focuses 
on the background of these factors, followed by how they 
relate to the Corps SAM program, and then present the 
advantages and disadvantages in terms of risk. At the end of 
this chapter, the factors will be presented in a summary table 
showing the decision on whether or not to down select. 
B.   ANALYSIS  OF  FACTORS  AFFECTING  THE  DOWN  SELECTION 
DECISION 
The choice between the down selection to one contractor 
and competition is a complex management decision. Factors 
that influence the decision of whether to down select or 
compete a procurement after PD-V phase (MS I) can be broken 
down into three categories: cost, schedule, and performance. 
[Ref. 16] [Ref.31] In applying the factors that are tailored 
to the Corps SAM program for the down selection decision, the 
researcher found: 
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1.   Cost Factors 
a. Quantity to be Procured 
Conceptually, the greater the quantity procured, the 
greater the potential for competition. There needs to be a 
sufficient quantity to be procured so that a contractor's 
capacity is used to the greatest extent. The contractor is 
naturally looking to achieve the greatest profit for their 
time invested. This decision is used primarily when the sum of 
the total recurring cost savings is less than the sum of the 
nonrecurring costs needed to establish two sources. [Ref. 
16:p. 3-3] 
Down selection to one contractor is inevitable in 
the procurement of Corps SAM and would occur at some point 
in the acquisition process due to the economies of scale 
associated with the low number of systems anticipated to be 
procured. According to Mr. Chester Domaracki, Deputy PM 
Corps SAM, the required number of systems to be procured is 
simply not enough work for two defense contractors to be 
carried into production of the Corps SAM system. The low 
quantity to be procured lends itself to down selection. 
A disadvantage to down selection as it pertains to 
quantity is an increased risk by not maintaining the 
industrial base and by not providing a second contractor for 
surge capacity. 
An advantage to having down selection as it pertains 
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to quantity is a reduced risk in the cost effectiveness in 
terms of the Government paying for excess capacity by one or 
both contractors. 
b.     Defense Budget and Down-sizing of the 
Industrial Base 
The shrinking defense budget is inherent in all the 
following  factors but today  more  than  ever, the  budget 
is a key factor.  Potential contractors fully understand that 
the "chicken who laid the golden eggs" is long gone and 
that there is a trend for future declines in defense 
appropriations by Congress. This acknowledgment of future 
trends is obvious through the recent mergers of defense 
contractors like Martin Marietta and Lockheed, Raytheon and 
E-Systems, and Northrop and Grumman. They are preparing to 
survive these lean times by combining their expertise and 
diversifying. There is also a problem with the limited number 
of subcontractors available, mentioned later in this chapter. 
This problem also extends to prime contractors and has 
occurred in the Corps SAM program. At the beginning of this 
program there were originally six contractors used for CED. 
Since these contracts were initiated, Martin Marietta and 
Lockheed, both separate contractors competing for the Corps 
SAM program, merged. 
Competition throughout the acquisition process may 
simply become totally unaffordable for the development of 
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new major weapon systems. The Government and industry are 
already feeling the "do more with less" trend. There is also 
no guarantee that the funding will be maintained as described 
in the background of the Corps SAM program. If this trend 
continues, down selection will be the only way to gain a 
contractor's interest in investing the company's time and 
effort. If down-sizing also continues in the Government, the 
ability to provide quality oversight management will be less 
effective with competition. 
A disadvantage of down selection is an increased 
risk in reduction of the industrial base. 
An advantage of down selection is decreased risk in 
cost due to running out of funding early on in the program. 
c. Contract Type 
The type of contract used, if designed carefully, 
can probably provide the same benefits as mentioned in Chapter 
III. A cost-plus-award-fee (CPAF) contract, used in the 
Design and Development phase, contains an award fee pool of 
money established by the Government to reward the contractor 
for meeting or exceeding a specific effort in meeting the 
Government's needs. The key element of this type of contract 
is the flexibility that it provides. The Government can 
change the area where it wants the contractor to be 
incentivized.  The Government can provide advance guidance for 
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any performance period influencing the contractor's efforts in 
areas of cost, schedule, and performance to ensure that the 
Government's needs are met. 
The Corps SAM contract will be a very complex cost 
type contract, consisting of a cost-plus-incentive-fee and 
CPAF. This contract type can be structured to gain the same 
benefits of competition according to the Deputy PM for Corps 
SAM. [Ref. 33] There is also a potential problem in using 
competition in a joint venture situation where the joint 
venture begins to act as a single entity exercising monopoly 
power. If the Government doesn't have the contracts or 
management oversight set up to control this, the benefits of 
competition will be lost. 
A disadvantage of down selection is the increased 
cost risk involved when the Government is dealing with only 
one contractor who may not be able to perform the contract. 
An advantage of down selection is the reduced cost 
risk when the Government is providing management oversight to 
only one contractor who can be incentivized to be successful. 
d.     Special  Tooling,   Test Equipment  and Facilities 
If costs of special tooling, test equipment and 
facilities are high, the number of potential competitive 
contractors will decrease, and the likelihood of cost 
effective competition will decrease,  providing the down 
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selection  to one contractor as the only alternative. 
[Ref. 31:p. 17] 
New technology implies that there will be special 
tooling, test eguipment and facilities and that their costs 
will be high. With the low guantity to be procured, it may 
not be advantageous for contractors to compete, especially if 
start up costs are significant. Down selecting to one 
contractor saves dual costs to the Government. 
A disadvantage of down selection is the increased 
cost risk of not having an additional source for tooling. 
An advantage of down selection is the reduced cost 
risk of not having dual costs for tooling. 
e. Contractor Capacity 
Adeguate capacity is necessary for down selection to 
one contractor. If the sole contractor doesn't have the 
capacity to produce the reguired guantity according to the 
delivery schedule, development of an additional source could 
be made mandatory to produce the difference. If the 
contractor has excess capacity, a reduction in the production 
guantity awarded may significantly increase the costs of 
production through increased overhead per unit. [Ref. 16:p. 
3-3] 
Contractor capacity is assumed to be adeguate for 
the effort reguired. Since no production facility is currently 
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manufacturing the Corps SAN system, it should be possible to 
minimize the risk associated with not having the capacity or 
excess capacity, since there is a fixed number of systems to 
be produced. In the downsizing environment that we are in 
today, contractor capacity should not be a problem. 
A disadvantage of down selection is the increased 
cost and schedule risk of having to create an additional 
source late in the production schedule, due to the original 
contractor not being able to produce the needed guantities or 
meet the delivery schedule. 
An advantage of down selection is the reduced cost 
risk in maintaining two sources for production. 
2.   Schedule Factors 
a. User Need Time Frame 
This factor is critical when dealing with a fixed 
budget and time frame. If two contractors were to be used, 
given a fixed amount of money each year, it would take longer 
to produce the weapon system. 
The Corps SAM program is working with a fixed budget 
each year, and the user needs the system as soon as possible. 
To field the Corps SAM weapon system as rapidly as possible, 
down selection is the better alternative to avoid increased 
program schedule length. 
A disadvantage of down selection is the increased 
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schedule risk if the single contractor incurs technical 
problems delaying the development of the weapon system. 
An advantage of down selection is the reduced 
schedule and cost risk where the Government has a fixed yearly 
budget in managing a single contractor. 
b.     Production Duration 
Conceptually, the shorter the duration of the 
projected production, the better choice down selection to one 
contractor becomes. Competition will result in increased up- 
front costs for the Government as compared to down selection, 
and both the Government and contractors may fail to gain the 
benefits of competition, especially if the two contractors are 
interested in a long production run. [Ref. 31:p. 16] A 
short duration also may not provide sufficient time to offset 
the cost in developing and gualifying both contractors. 
The duration of the production phase is estimated to 
be four to five years and is considered extremely short 
compared to, for example, the 13 years of production 
experienced by the Patriot system. This factor definitely 
provides no incentive for competition, when a sole source will 
only be in production for such a short time. 
A disadvantage of down selection is increased cost 
and schedule risk due to the lack of competition, especially 
if a surge need is developed. 
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An advantage of down selection is the reduced cost 
risk of establishing and maintaining two production 
facilities. 
c.     Learning Curve 
Conceptually, the flatter the learning the curve, 
the greater the potential for competition. With a steeper 
learning curve there is a greater potential for two 
contractors in a joint venture to become unbalanced in 
technical capability and they may not be able to effectively 
compete, due to the potential unbalanced technical 
capabilities, where the more learned producer can decrease 
unit costs rapidly as cumulative quantity of the product 
increases. In this situation, the Government has weak leverage 
to maintain teaming in technology transfer. [Ref. 16:p. 2- 
19] [Ref. 31:p. 17] 
Due to the seamless transition providing 
continuity with the Design and Development phase, the Corps 
SAM program will gain the benefits of the learning curve. 
This program structure allows for continuity in design, 
hardware build, and testing throughout the program. This 
allows mitigation of the risks associated with the gaps in 
these activities normally associated with the classical two- 
step development process. It significantly reduces the 
likelihood of losing experienced personnel and vendors during 
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these gaps. The Corps SAM concept will use new technology to 
fulfill the requirements. New technology implies the 
probability of a steep learning curve. The less capable 
competitor may not be able to effectively compete with the 
more capable producer. If able to compete, the other 
contractor may not be able to "catch up" if the more capable 
producer can decrease unit costs rapidly as cumulative 
quantity of the product increases. Competition can dilute the 
benefits of the learning curve as compared to a down selection 
situation. Leveraging the advantages of the learning curve in 
the down selection to one contractor is a strong point for 
choosing down selection. 
A disadvantage of down selection is the increased 
cost and schedule risk involved in not leveraging the use of 
two contractors to reduce costs and provide two production 
facilities. 
An advantage of down selection is the reduced cost 
risk of leveraging the single contractor's learning curve. 
d.     Degree of Subcontracting 
If a majority of the system is subcontracted, down 
selection to one contractor would be the preferred method over 
production competition for two reasons. First, if the 
specific subcontractors needed are limited, the prime 
contractors will compete for the same subcontractors, which 
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could result in higher prices. Second, with most of the 
system being subcontracted out, competition between primes 
would be futile since they only control a small part of the 
production costs. [Ref. 16:p. 3-5] 
For the Corps SAM system, the number of 
subcontractors available is limited, and competition by two 
primes would result in use both primes using the same 
subcontractors. This would definitely result in higher prices 
for subsystems, given fixed total guantities. [Ref. 33] 
A disadvantage of down selection is the increased 
cost and schedule risk of maintaining the industrial base of 
subcontractors. 
An advantage of down selection is the reduced cost 
and schedule risk involved in a limited number of 
subcontractors. The single prime contractor can promote 
competition among subcontractors where two prime contractors 
could not. 
3.   Performance Factors 
a. Technical  Complexity 
In general, the more complex the system is in terms 
of external and internal interfaces, as well as software 
dependency, the more appealing competition appears. When high 
levels of technology are used, the Government can leverage the 
expertise of both contractors.  If the Government uses only 
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one contractor, it may take longer to solve the technical 
problem or it may be unsolvable without additional outside 
expertise. If production competition is desired, direct 
contractor-to-contractor exchange is required in Technical 
Data Package (TDP) transfers.  [Ref. 16:p. 3-4] 
Two contractors will be carried through the PD-V 
phase and might have been used through Design and Development 
phase; however, during the CED studies there were significant 
similarities in the technical solutions proposed. These 
significant similarities may constitute a waiver for 
Competitive System Protoyping. Since there is little need for 
comparison among technologies between the contractors, there 
is no need to carry both through Design and Development. The 
Deputy PM for Corps SAM stated that this will save them 
hundreds of millions of dollars in their program. [Ref. 33] 
The purpose of the two contractors going through PD-V is to 
determine and select the contractor who provides the "best 
value" in terms of system concept and program. 
The Corps SAM system will be highly software 
dependent and will be the most complex, technologically 
advanced weapon system in the U.S. Army's Air Defense 
Artillery. Software in major weapon system development is 
well known for causing cost overruns, schedule overruns, and 
performance problems. There is a potential for major problems 
in only having one contractor. 
A disadvantage to down selection is the increased 
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performance and cost risk involved in not leveraging the 
expertise of an additional contractor who may discover 
technological and innovative breakthroughs not realized by 
using only one contractor. 
An advantage of the down selection in Corps SAM is 
that there are significant similarities in the technical 
solutions proposed and thus little need for comparison among 
technologies between the contractors. 
b.     Configuration Control  and Maintenance 
Requirements 
Competition may very well involve the fielding of 
two systems that perform identically, but do not use the same 
maintenance parts and procedures. This is not a problem in 
down selection to one contractor; however, it would be a 
reason to choose down selection over production competition. 
[Ref. 16:p. 13-9] 
The PM is confronted with configuration control and 
design responsibilities once the contractor team is split for 
competitive production. It isn't cost efficient to have two 
different contractors building two systems that perform 
identically, but use different maintenance parts and 
procedures. It also isn't cost efficient in terms of 
maintaining two complete sets of spares for two systems. The 
PM could establish a configuration control board to ensure 
strict configuration maintenance.   This move to achieve 
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configuration control may also discourage innovative design 
changes that could reduce costs; both are reasons for 
conducting production competition. This should be a 
discriminator for choosing down selection. 
A disadvantage to down selection is the increased 
performance and cost risk by not having two contractors that 
can provide spares. 
An advantage of down selection is the reduced 
performance and cost risk by not having to maintain two 
complete sets of spares for two almost identical systems. 
Different spares may also have an impact on reliability and 
survivability among the same system. 
4.   The International Factor to be Considered 
The desires of the Quadrilateral International partners 
are taken seriously by the U.S. Government, which wants this 
international program to be successful. This political 
interest has resulted in the international partners exerting 
a large influence on the acquisition process, namely the 
desire for down selection to one contractor and incorporation 
of the NATO Acquisition Process. The international partners 
have a vested interest in this program, because they have a 
mission need and a shrinking defense budget as well. They 
agree with the partnership approach and have been adamant 
about working with only one U.S. contractor. The international 
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associates believe building a partnership with a single 
contractor will be the most efficient means to control risk 
and affordability. Politically, down selection is the better 
choice. 
C.   SUMMARY 
Thus we see that, on balance, the PM's choice to down 
select reduces risk. The PM has many factors to consider in 
managing and controlling risk. The presence or absence of such 
factors mentioned in this chapter denote sources of potential 
risk in a program. In this situation, the program can be 
jeopardized. If these factors are analyzed by the PM, an 
assessment can be made and action taken to overcome each 
factor's inherent risk that can cause the program to be over 
cost, behind schedule, or result in a weapon system that falls 
short of the user's reguirements. Table 1 is presented on the 
following page that consolidates the factors discussed in this 
chapter. 
49 
COMPETITION VS. DOWN SELECTION DECISION MODEL 
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V.  THE ECONOMIC VIEW OF COMPETITION 
A.   INTRODUCTION 
In Defense procurement it is an implicit assumption that 
the competition created in the acquisition process is 
imperfect competition and that competition is good. At the 
other end of the spectrum it is also an implicit assumption 
that down selection creates a monopoly and that down selection 
is the less desirable alternative. The purpose of this chapter 
is to question these assumptions by examining the underlying 
economic aspects of different types of competition. 
B.   CLASSIFICATIONS OF COMPETITION 
In economics, competition is classified in the 
marketplace into five principal categories: perfect 
competition; effective competition; imperfect competition, 
which consists of monopolistic, oligopolistic, and 
oligopsonistic competition; monopoly; and monopsony. The 
determining factors in each of these classifications are based 
on the number of buyers and sellers in the market: 
[Ref. 18:p. 2-2-2-3] 
Perfect Competition exists when there are many 
sellers and buyers, the product is homogeneous 
and perfectly interchangeable, and the price is 
determined by supply and demand. The seller may 
decide to sell or refuse to sell at the existing 
51 
price; the seller does not control the price. 
Effective Competition is the same as perfect 
competition, except that the number of sellers is 
limited. There must however, be enough sellers 
so that no one seller dominates the market. All 
sellers are independent and active rivals, and 
new firms can enter the market easily. 
Monopolistic Competition is the same as perfect 
competition, except that there is product 
differentiation; that is, the sellers are able to 
establish real or illusory differences among the 
products they offer for sale. The seller is able 
to control price to some degree if buyers can be 
convinced that the seller's product is different 
from those of other sellers. Much retail trade 
falls into this category. 
Oligopolistic Competition exists when there are 
few sellers and many buyers of products that have 
degrees of difference. The seller, through 
advertising and quality differentiation, is able 
to control price to some extent. Products such as 
cars, major appliances, and steel are included in 
this category. 
Oligopsonistic Competition is like oligopolistic 
competition, except that there are many sellers 
and only a few buyers. Sellers of raw materials 
such as tobacco growers are in this category. 
Monopoly exists when there is one seller and one 
or more buyers of a product that has no close 
substitutes. The seller has considerable control 
over price, so much that the prices of some 
sellers, like utilities, are regulated. Monopoly 
also exists when, as with sole-source military 
items, there is one seller and one buyer. The 
seller's control over price varies according to 
circumstances that determine bargaining strength. 
Monopsony exists when there are one or more 
sellers and one buyer of interchangeable 
products. The sellers tend to have little 
effective control over price. 
In summary, under perfect and effective competition the 
seller has no control over price.  The seller has more control 
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over price if the seller is closer to being the only one 
offering the specific product, as long as there are many- 
buyers. 
It is inherent in competition that both seller and buyer 
will try to take advantage of the situation, according to 
their own advantage. The seller will offer a price that will 
satisfy its goals and the buyer will pay a price no higher 
than necessary to get the product that will satisfy its 
objective. The one that will prevail depends on the relative 
bargaining strengths of each, the number of buyers and sellers 
of the product, the costs, the amount of profit, the intensity 
of demand, and the alternatives available to both buyers and 
sellers. The Government as the buyer must agree on a price 
that is fair and reasonable; that is, the Government accepts 
the agreement based on best value and the seller accepts the 
agreement based on full costs plus a reasonable profit. 
[Ref. 18:p. 2-5] 
The Corps SAM Program Manager is operating as a 
monopsonist (the sole buyer). This situation is one of 
monopsony, lending itself to competitive negotiations. Though 
there is a Quadrilateral International partnership involved, 
members are essentially a joint entity wanting to purchase the 
same product. There is no competition among these buyers 
(monopsonists) to vie for the sellers' product and each 
partner's desire is the goal of all the buyers. This 
partnership is a synergistic relationship such that all the 
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partners will be able to buy the Corps SAM weapon system, 
which individually they could not afford. 
C.   MONOPSONY 
So, why does the Government use competition? The answer 
is monopsonistic leverage. The individual price the 
monopsonist (one buyer) pays to each oligopolists (a few 
sellers) is likely to be lower than the Government would pay 
to a monopolist (one seller) in a bilateral monopoly. 
Although the monopsonist has an advantage over the 
oligopolistic contractors, the Government is not likely to use 
its advantage to the fullest extent. Too low a price would 
drive the contractors out of business or cause collusion among 
the contractors. The Government will therefore pay enough to 
keep the contractors in business, probably at a relatively low 
rate of profit. In both monopsony and bilateral monopoly, at 
the end of negotiations, the result that both the Government 
and contractor want is a mutually satisfying agreement. 
Initially, once a nonmaterial solution is no longer an 
option, competition is critical for the Government to discover 
what is the latest technology available, by using design 
competition. As in the Corps SAM program, the similarity in 
technical approaches of the contractors negated the need for 
competitive prototyping and for competition beyond the PD-V 
phase.  Competition is one method or the preferred method for 
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Controlling risk, gaining reduced cost, better quality and 
reliability, technical innovation, expansion of the industrial 
base, and the appearance of safeguarding the public trust in 
using the public's funds. Competition is the only option to 
control risk at the beginning of the acquisition process, 
however, it is not the only option after PD-V phase. It is 
important to understand that competition provides the 
appearance of safeguarding the public's funds. The Government 
could also obtain the benefits of competition by using a 
bilateral monopoly where the contractor would feel that it and 
the Government would be on a more level playing field. The 
Government would show a sincere level of trust that isn't 
found in monopsony where the Government appears to be 
achieving a cheaper price for a quality product. The 
bilateral monopoly lends itself to a more level playing field 
and a more trusting relationship between the Government and 
the contractor—more so than a monopsonistic situation. 
D.   BILATERAL MONOPOLY 
Once the Corps SAM Program Manager down selects to one 
contractor, there is no longer a monopsony. It is a bilateral 
monopoly, not a monopoly. What happens when a monopolist (the 
contractor-seller) negotiates with a monopsonist (the 
Government-buyer)? When there are only one seller and one 
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buyer, this market is called, a bilateral monopoly. Both the 
buyer and seller are in a bargaining situation. There is no 
rule that will determine if this will be a win-win, win-lose, 
or lose-lose situation. One party might have more time and 
patience, or might be able to convince the other party that it 
will walk away if the price is too low or too high. 
This bilateral monopoly is rare, but there is a rough 
principle that applies: Monopsony power and monopoly power 
will counteract each other. This means that the monopsony 
power of buyers will reduce the effective monopoly power of 
sellers, and vice versa. This doesn't mean that the market 
will end up looking perfectly competitive. For example, the 
monopoly power may be large and monopsony power small, so that 
the residual monopoly power would still be significant. A 
characteristic of a bilateral monopoly that places the two 
parties on a level playing field, egualizing the monopoly and 
monopsony power, is if the parties cannot easily enter into 
the other's niche. The Government cannot easily build the 
Corps SAM system itself and the contractor cannot create a 
market to sell to. If each party cannot enter the other's 
field, both are likely to be reasonable in negotiating a 
contract price. 
A bilateral monopsony could look perfectly competitive. 
Conceptually, monopsony power of the buyer will push the price 
closer to marginal cost, and monopoly power will push price 
closer to marginal benefit. In other words, at the margin, the 
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buyer and seller will have to negotiate a contract that is 
mutually satisfying. [Ref. 30:p. 357-362] The bilateral 
monopoly between the Government and the down selected 
contractor has the similar effect of a market that would be 
perfectly competitive. Just like perfect competition where 
there are many buyers and many sellers, a bilateral monopoly 
between the Government and the contractor creates a situation 
where both have roughly equal power. 
In perfect competition, there are many buyers and many 
sellers so that each buyer or seller has a negligible 
influence on price in the market. In a bilateral monopoly, 
the Government has created the market: a one buyer, one seller 
market. There is a negligible influence on price in this 
market. The Government wants a quality product at a fair and 
reasonable price and the contractor wants to provide a quality 
product for a fair and reasonable profit.- In perfect 
competition, the product is homogeneous so that the product is 
identical to every other product such that buyers and sellers 
are indifferent, given the price, about whom they buy from or 
sell to. In a bilateral monopoly, the Government is buying a 
product that doesn't currently exist. The weapon system is 
homogeneous unto itself and thus, in a sense it is a one of a 
kind product. Thus, like perfect competition, in the 
bilateral monopoly the bottom line is the price, given that 
quality can be controlled. More so than a monopsonistic 
situation, the bilateral monopoly leads to a level playing 
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field and a more trusting relationship through partnering 
between the Government and the contractor. 
E.   PARTHERING 
In a bilateral monopoly, the contractor can prove to be 
an invaluable resource to the Government by making direct 
contributions to the program's success. A sound relationship 
between the Government and the contractor can facilitate: the 
buyer's efforts to gain cooperation on cost reduction 
programs; willingness to provide innovations in processes, 
procedures and technological advancements; superior weapon 
performance; and guality service. Such relationships are a 
major divergence from the more traditional adversarial 
relationships between the Government and the contractor. Trust 
must be developed in a long-term relationship where the 
Government shares its true needs with the contractor, and the 
contractor provides a weapon system that fulfills the needs of 
the user. Partnering can also provide a level of oversight by 
the Government that is not adversarial and that will enhance 
the acguisition process in terms of cost, schedule, and 
performance.  [Ref. 19:p. 179-181] 
The lack of competition after MS I will be 
supplanted by the Corps SAM management process based on the 
concept of partnering. This relationship is based on the 
understanding that the Government and the contractor both want 
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to reach the same goals. The Government wants the contractors 
to earn a fair and reasonable profit, and the contractor wants 
the Government to receive a weapon system that performs 
according to the reguirements. Following award of the Design 
and Development contract to the contractor whose proposal 
offers the "best value" to the Government, the Government and 
contractor partnership will enter a partner building phase to 
build a foundation for a successful program execution. Program 
reguirements, detailed plans, streamlining efforts, program 
management control points and plans to satisfy exit criteria 
will be reviewed and refined during this period. The 
partnering approach will reduce program risk due to a mutual, 
early understanding of the program baseline and early 
consideration of all factors that relate to successful 
execution of the program reguirements. This will then enhance 
program stability and affordability, since there will be less 
chance of change, redesign, redirection, or conflicting 
perspectives as the program is executed.  [Ref. 12:p. C-7] 
This approach makes sense since Corps SAM manpower and 
management oversight is limited, and the guality of that 
oversight would be degraded if it had to be spread over two 
contractors. The schedule duration could also be increased due 
to the increased program complexity of trying to manage a 
competitive program after MS I. 
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F.   SUMMARY 
This chapter introduced the classifications of 
competition from an economic standpoint and explained that 
once the Corps SAM PM down selects to one contractor, there 
will be a bilateral monopoly. This situation provides a level 
playing field, allowing the Government and contractor to trust 
each other. This professional, trusting relationship is 
further reinforced through partnering, creating a win-win 
situation that is mutually satisfying. 
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VI.  SUMMARY AND AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
A.   SUMMARY 
Down selection to one contractor will provide more 
benefit than competition to the Corps SAM program. Down 
selection will provide the Government with a bilateral 
monopoly that places both the buyer and seller in a bargaining 
position, where no one party has the "upper hand." The 
Government and the contractor will negotiate a CPAF/CPIF 
contract that is mutually satisfying and reasonable for the 
Design and Development phase. The low quantity to be procured 
and the short duration of production will preclude awarding of 
development and production contracts to two contractors, due 
to economies of scale. The similarity in technical approaches 
of the contractors also negates the need for competitive 
prototyping to occur. By working with one contractor early 
on, partnering will be well-established in order to control 
risk and affordability. There should be less redesign, 
changes to hardware and software, and redirection of effort, 
because "everyone is on the same sheet of music." This will 
result in a much more efficient and effective development 
process, when coupled with the flexibility of a CPAF contract. 
The down selection allows for continuity of design, hardware 
build, and testing throughout the program. With this seamless 
transition between DEM/VAL and EMD (both of these phases make 
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up the Design and Development phase), the likelihood of losing 
experienced personnel and subcontractors is significantly- 
reduced, while leveraging the learning curve by having the 
same contractor throughout the whole process. The special 
tooling, test equipment and facilities costs will be reduced 
significantly by not having two contractors. 
Down selection is the better alternative because with the 
declining defense budget, we are also experiencing a declining 
Government manpower and defense industry base. This means 
that contractors will be forced to be more competitive early 
on to survive the trend today and of the future—that of the 
shrinking defense budget. This will mean early "best and 
final offers" and force the contractors to control costs once 
CPAF contracts are awarded. The bottom line is that both the 
Government and industry will have to "do more with less." 
The final reason for down selection is politically 
driven. The Quadrilateral International partners want down 
selection as they feel it is the best way to control costs and 
risks. 
On May 18, 1995 an Acquisition Reform Bill was introduced 
in the House as part of the Federal Acquisition Reform Act 
(FARA) that states that competitions would be held to the 
"maximum extent practical." This would relax the current 
preference for full and open competition. Congress may be 
recognizing that competition with new Government weapons 
programs may not be the better means of providing the benefits 
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of quality and best value after all.  [Ref. 20:p.4] 
In conclusion, down selection to one contractor appears 
to provide more benefit and lowered risk than competition to 
the Corps SAM program. Sun Tzu might have stated that in 
choosing this alternative that the Corps SAM Program Office 
"need not fear the result of a hundred battles" [Ref. 35 :p. 
18]— they know their capabilities and those of the "enemy." 
B.   AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
There are several areas within the Corps SAM program that 
are candidates for further research. These potential topics 
are listed below. 
What has been and is the role of politics involved in the 
shaping of the Corps SAM program? How has politics affected 
the acquisition process in terms of controlling cost, 
schedule, and performance? Politics has kept this program 
alive, but how has politics influenced the PM in the execution 
of the program? 
How has the Quadrilateral International partnership 
affected the Corps SAM acquisition process? How has it 
supported or hindered the risk of this program in terms of 
controlling cost, schedule, and performance? How has the NATO 
acquisition process affected the program? 
How has down selection to one contractor affected the 
success of the Corps SAM program? Was down selection actually 
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more beneficial than competition in terms of controlling cost, 
schedule, and performance? Did the early planning pay- 
off? 
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